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Ioutline Bell’s vision of the “great enterprise” ofscience, and his view that conventional teachingsabout quantum mechanics constituted a betrayal
of this enterprise. I describe a proposal of his to put
the theory on a more satisfactory footing, and review
the subsequent uses that have been made of one ele-
ment of this proposal, namely Bell’s transition proba-
bilities regarded as fundamental physical processes.
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1 Introduction
John Bell was a scientist. That was a vocation that he
followed with great respect, devotion and sense of respon-
sibility. For him, to be a scientist was to participate in the
“great enterprise” [1] of understanding the world we live
in; in particular, to be a physicist was to pursue the grand
vision of describing the physical world in terms of its ulti-
mate constituents and delineating how those constituents
behave. The great enterprise is undertaken according to
the scientific method: first, carefully observe and exper-
iment to see how what happens in the world; second,
imaginatively construct theories to explain these observa-
tions; third, rigorously test these theories by calculating
what they predict for the results of further experiments. If
these predictions are successful, we can feel, diffidently
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and tentatively, that we have made progress towards our
original goal of truly describing and understanding the
world.
When Bell embarked on his career as a physicist, the
furthest advances towards the goal of physics were rep-
resented by quantum mechanics, as developed and ex-
pounded by Bohr, Born and Heisenberg. All the pro-
fessional training he received followed the teaching of
these great men: not only their discoveries, but also their
pronouncements on how these discoveries should be re-
garded, and how future physics should be conducted. Bell
was puzzled and dismayed. He felt that everything he was
taught constituted a betrayal of the great enterprise: a sur-
render to the difficulties of the pursuit, and an insistence
that there was no alternative but to join the leaders of the
field in retreat.
The doctrine which he found all physicists were ex-
pected to accept seemed to him to be a distortion of the
scientific method. It dismissed, or forgot, the purpose of
the method, and held up the method itself as if the very
essence of science was contained in the third of these
steps: the purpose of physics is to predict the results of
experiments. It was a central feature of quantum me-
chanics, according to the founding fathers, that it could
only describe the results of experiments. The aim of de-
scribing the world apart from experiments was totally and
explicitly abandoned. This doctrine was criticised, in a
text-book influenced by Bell, as follows:
It cannot be true that the sole purpose of a sci-
entific theory is to predict the results of experi-
ments. Why on earth would anyone want to pre-
dict the results of experiments? Most of them
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have no practical use; and even if they had, prac-
tical usefulness has nothing to do with scientific
enquiry. Predicting the results of experiments
is not the purpose of a theory, it is a test to see
if the theory is true. The purpose of a theory is
to understand the physical world. [2, p. 214]
In Bell’s own words,
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively
about piddling laboratory operations is to be-
tray the great enterprise. [1, p. 34]
Bell’s unhappiness with this situation led him to exam-
ine the possibility of explaining the results of quantum
mechanics in terms of “hidden variables”—some way of
describing the actual disposition of the material world, re-
gardless of whether any experiments were being done. In
the early 1960s it was known that this could be done, fol-
lowing David Bohm’s revival in 1952 of a model proposed
by Louis de Broglie in 1927. However, although this was
known, it was not widely known; indeed, it was generally
thought to be impossible because of Pauli’s early oppo-
sition, to which de Broglie himself surrendered, and a
supposed proof by the respected mathematician John von
Neumann. But as Bell wrote,
In 1952 I saw the impossible done. [3]
In [3] he analysed the reasons why it continued to be the
accepted opinion that hidden variables were impossible,
and acknowledged that there were good reasons not to like
the de Broglie/Bohm model; Einstein, for example, whom
Bell followed in his dissatisfaction with quantum mechan-
ics, found this solution “cheap”. It made sense, there-
fore, for Bell to look at the full range of possible hidden-
variable models; and in doing so he discovered that one
particular reason for disliking the de Broglie/Bohm model
was unavoidable: any such model would necessarily ex-
hibit nonlocality, the feature that distant parts of the
model would affect each other instantaneously. This dis-
covery is what Bell is famous for. In this paper, however,
I want to focus on one of his later contributions to the
project of rescuing the great enterprise. But I should
emphasise that there is no substitute for reading Bell’s
contributions in his own wonderfully elegant and enter-
taining sentences [4, 5].
2 Beables
For Bell, the feature of nonlocality, or action at a distance,
was no reason to reject a theory. It might be surprising, it
might be difficult to reconcile with special relativity, and
it might, as it did for Einstein, defy one’s presupposition
of what a scientific description of the world should look
like; but this is outweighed by the virtue of actually giving
a description of the world, independent of human beings
and “piddling laboratory operations” [1]. In conversation,
Bell would emphasise that he would encourage anyone
working on a theory with this overriding virtue. He put
aside his own opinions as to whether the work was likely
to be successful; the important thing was to get physicists
thinking in a healthy, “professional” [6] way. And he
was enormously helpful and supportive: I remember, at a
conference in 1987, diffidently giving him the manuscript
of a paper at the end of one afternoon. Despite attending
an alcoholic reception that evening, he sought me out the
next morning to give me detailed comments.
Bell’s hostility to the official version of quantum me-
chanics, as preached in nearly all university physics
courses, is emblazoned in the two words of the title of his
paper Against ‘measurement’ [1]. Another key word to
which he took exception is “observable”. This is the only
word available in the official theory to refer to properties
of physical objects; it insists that the only quantities that
can have any place in a physical theory are those which
can be measured, or observed. In line with his convic-
tion that a theory should describe physical objects them-
selves, regardless of their relation to human observers,
Bell proposed [7] to replace the word “observable” by a
new coinage of “beable” to emphasise the autonomous
existence of the quantities in question.
In the de Broglie/Bohm theory of non-relativistic many-
particle quantum mechanics, the beables are the positions
of the particles. This might be one of the reasons why
the theory is not universally liked. A fundamental fea-
ture of the conventional theory is that all the quantities
of classical mechanics, namely, functions on phase space,
have quantum counterparts which enter the theory on
an equal footing, as they do in Hamiltonian mechanics.
This symmetry under canonical transformations, becom-
ing unitary symmetry in quantum mechanics, is widely
regarded as very attractive. It is explicitly broken in
de Broglie/Bohm theory. Bell defended this, arguing
that all actual observations in experimental physics come
down to measurements of position (e.g. of pointers in
instruments). This strikes me as dubious, and anyway
it represents a reliance on experimental considerations
which is curiously inappropriate in the author of Against
‘measurement’. However, in the paper [6] on which I now
want to focus, Bell addressed a more serious problem:
de Broglie/Bohm theory is non-relativistic, and is a the-
ory of a finite number of particles. On the other hand,
the fundamental theories which Bell was seeking as an
elementary particle physicist would have to be relativistic,
and they would have to be theories of fields, not particles.
Hence his title: Beables for quantum field theory.
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In this paper Bell tackled only one of these desider-
ata. He proposed a quantum theory of fields with a
clearly defined set of beables, quantities with privileged
ontological status, and with dynamics which reproduced
the predictions of orthodox quantum theory, just as the
de Broglie/Bohm equation of motion reproduces the pre-
dictions of the Schro¨dinger equation. But his theory is not
relativistic. He assumes an absolute distinction between
space and time, in which time is continuous but space is
taken to be a discrete three-dimensional lattice L. The
beables of the theory are the total numbers of fermions at
the points of the lattice. These fermion numbers are the
eigenvalues of the field operators
B(x) =
∑
i
ψi(x)†ψi(x), x ∈ L (1)
where ψi is a particular variety of Dirac field, labelled by i,
and the sum is over all such varieties. Thus the actual
situation of the world, is given by the set of integers
{F(x) : x ∈ L} representing numbers of fermions at all
points of the lattice. Bell does not consider it necessary
or even possible for the numbers of different types of
fermion to be beables, since interacting fields will not all
commute. He regards microscopic details such as these
as “entirely redundant. What is essential is to be able
to define the positions of things”, by which he seems to
mean things that we would recognise in our macroscopic
world. His only elucidation of these “things” is that they
should include “positions of instrument pointers or (the
modern equivalent) of ink on computer output”. This is
not intended to be exhaustive: it is not that these are the
only beables but that the beables must at least include the
positions of instrument pointers.
3 Transition probabilities
In Bell’s model the state of the world at each time t is
given by an element n(t) of the discrete set of functions
n : L → N (N being the set of non-negative integers),
so each n is a set of non-negative integers, one for each
lattice point. The change of this state with time is gov-
erned, as in de Broglie/Bohm theory, by a time-dependent
element |Ψ(t)〉 of a Hilbert space spanned by eigenvectors
of the field operators. We are used to calling |Ψ(t)〉 a
“state vector”, but in this theory that terminology is mis-
leading: |Ψ(t)〉 does not describe a state of the world, but
something that governs change in the state of the world.
Let us call it the “pilot vector”, in memory of the pilot
wave of de Broglie/Bohm theory. However, the value of
|Ψ(t)〉 is a fact about the world, and Bell therefore consid-
ered |Ψ(t)〉, as well as n(t), to be a beable. The complete
specification of the world at time t is then given by the
pair (n(t), |Ψ(t)〉).
The way that the world changes in time is an adaptation
of the evolution equations of de Broglie/Bohm theory. As
in that theory, the pilot vector |Ψ(t)〉 evolves according to
the Schro¨dinger equation with a Hamiltonian H:
ı~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)〉 = H|Ψ(t)〉. (2)
Because the possible values of n(t) are a discrete set, how-
ever, the change from one value to another is stochastic:
Bell postulates that if, at time t, the value of the total
fermion number distribution is m, then the probability
that at time t + δt its value has changed to n is wmnδt
where the transition probability wmn is given by
wmn =
 2Re[(ı~)
−1〈n|H|m〉cncm]
〈ψ(t)|Pm |ψ(t)〉 if this is ≥ 0
0 if it is negative
(3)
where Pm is the projection onto the subspace of simulta-
neous eigenstates of the local occupation number opera-
tors B(x) in which the eigenvalue of B(x) is m(x). Bell
then shows that this joint time development is consis-
tent with the probabilities given by the Born rule in the
same sense as in de Broglie/Bohm theory: if the Born
rule holds at some initial time, i.e. the value of the total
fermion number distribution at that time is given proba-
bilistically so that the probability of the distribution m is
〈Ψ(0)|Pm|Ψ(0)〉, then this remains true at all subsequent
times.
Bell found the stochastic nature of this time develop-
ment “unwelcome”; he suspected that it was purely a
consequence of his artificial assumption of a discrete lat-
tice of points of space, and that it would “go away in
some sense in the continuum limit”. Indeed, it was shown
by Vink [8] and myself [9], working independently, that
a stochastic model of a particle on a one-dimensional
lattice, modelled on this theory of Bell’s, did become
the deterministic de Broglie/Bohm theory in the contin-
uum limit. Bell’s unease arose from his respect for the
time-reversal invariance of both quantum and classical
mechanics, in the forms of Schro¨dinger’s equation and
Newton’s equations of motion. Others, however, have
welcomed both stochastic elements in fundamental theory,
as reflecting our actual experience of quantum phenom-
ena, and non-invariance under time reversal, as reflecting
the true nature of time. (“Others” here possibly means
just myself [10].)
The transition probabilities introduced by Bell can be
used in a wide variety of theories, not restricted to those
which postulate a special class of quantities which are
“beable”. In general, consider a theory which supposes
that there is a true description of the world by means of
a vector |Ψ(t)〉 which evolves according to a Schro¨dinger
equation with Hamiltonian H, and that there is some
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reason to give special consideration to one of the compo-
nents of this vector in a decomposition given by special
subspaces Sn of the Hilbert space H , known as viable
subspaces. Thus H is the orthogonal direct sum of the
subspaces Sn, and any |Ψ〉 ∈ H can be written
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ψn(t)〉 with |ψn(t)〉 ∈ Sn. (4)
Then |ψn(t)〉 = Pn|Ψ(t)〉 where Pn is the orthogonal pro-
jection onto the subspace Sn. As |Ψ(t)〉 changes in ac-
cordance with the Schro¨dinger equation, the components
|ψn(t)〉 = Pn|Ψ(t)〉 will also change inside their respective
viable subspaces; but in addition to this, the spotlight
shining on the component with special status will also
move stochastically from one subspace to another. This
stochastic change is given by Bell’s transition probabili-
ties: if the special component is in subspace Sm at time t,
then the probability that it has moved to subspace Sn by
time t + δt is wmnδt where wmn is given by (3). If the
viable subspaces Sn are themselves changing with time,
then there is an extra term in this equation (cf. [10, 11]).
I will refer to theories with this structure as “gener-
alised Bell-type theories”. All such theories share the
property proved by Bell for his version of quantum field
theory: the transition probabilities (3) guarantee the con-
tinuing validity of the Born rule if it is valid initially. They
are not uniquely determined by this requirement: there
is a range of possible transition probabilities with the
same property [11]. However, Bell’s formula is uniquely
natural in applications to decay [10] and measurement
processes [12,13]: it ensures that the underlying direction
of change in such processes is always forwards, with-
out intermittent reversals (decay products, for example,
recombining to reconstitute the unstable decaying state).
In many such theories the special status of the high-
lighted component |ψn(t)〉 is ontological; only this compo-
nent describes the actual state of the world, and the func-
tion of the overall vector |Ψ(t)〉 is to act as a pilot, guiding
the discontinuous quantum transitions of the world. Such
theories are liable to face a preferred basis problem: what
defines the viable subspaces Sn? Bell formulated the
concept of beables precisely to give an answer to this
problem: the viable subspaces are the eigenspaces of be-
ables. In the original de Broglie/Bohm theory, the beables
are the particle positions. We have already noted on the
one hand the unease this arouses because of its violation
of symmetry under canonical transformations, and on
the other hand Bell’s defence of it on the grounds that
ultimately all observations are of position.
In Bell’s theory in [6], the beables are the total fermion
numbers at each point in the lattice of space. At first sight
it seems reasonable that these should have fundamental
status, but this is thrown into doubt by the Unruh effect,
according to which the number of particles present in
a region of space depends on a frame of reference as
soon as one moves away from frames in constant relative
motion.
This preferred-basis problem is also often thought to
arise in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. That theory has only the universal state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 and does not single out a component of that vec-
tor as describing the actual world. Nevertheless, if the
vector |Ψ(t)〉 is regarded as describing many worlds, all
of which are real, then some commentators, including
Bell [14], demand that there should be a specification
of which vectors or subspaces can describe “worlds”.
However, this is not a problem in Everett’s original ver-
sion [15] of this interpretation but only arises when too
much weight is placed on the expository terminology of
“worlds” [2, p. 221]. Even with this terminology, the
components of the state vector |Ψ(t)〉 which describe
worlds can be determined by the structure of |Ψ(t)〉 it-
self [16] and need no independent definition.
Other generalised Bell-type theories have no preferred-
basis problem, defining the viable subspaces purely in
terms of the pilot vector |Ψ(t)〉. In the (now largely dis-
carded) modal interpretation, in which the universe is
divided into two systems so that the Hilbert space H is
a tensor product of two factors, the viable components
are defined by the Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ(t)〉 with
respect to this structure.
The format of a generalised Bell-type theory is appro-
priate to describe the changing experience of a sentient
subsystem of the physical universe [17]. This can be
done in the context of Everettian theory, in which the
universe is described by a single time-dependent state
vector |Ψ(t)〉, and nothing else. We know that the universe
has sentient subsystems, each of which is capable of ex-
periences relating to the rest of the universe. I am myself
such a subsystem. I have various possible experiences,
for each of which there is a set of physical states of my
body in which I have the experience. Since I can distin-
guish between the experiences (if I could not they would
not be different experiences), it seems to be in keeping
with quantum mechanics that the corresponding states
form a set of orthogonal subspaces Smen of my Hilbert
space Hme. These subspaces then define a set of sub-
spaces Sn = Smen ⊗ Hrest of the universal Hilbert space
H = Hme ⊗ Hrest. The changes in my experience then
constitute transitions between these subspaces. Bell’s
formula (3) gives the probabilities of these transitions,
subject to a universal state vector and a universal Hamil-
tonian.
This formalism can also be used [12, 13] to model the
progress of a quantum measurement.
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4 Histories
Once a significant set of preferred subspaces has been
identified for each time t, a generalised Bell-type theory
makes it possible to calculate probabilities for histories of
the system. It is usual, and convenient, to consider only a
discrete set of times t1, . . . , t f ; then a history of the system
is a sequence (S1, . . . ,S f ) where each Si is a closed sub-
space of the Hilbert space of the system, or equivalently a
sequence of projection operators h = (Π1, . . . ,Π f ) where
Πi is the projection onto Si. Such histories are the funda-
mental concepts in the consistent histories interpretation
of quantum mechanics [18], in which the probability of
the history h is taken to be
P(h) = tr[Π˜1 . . . Π˜ f−1Π˜ f Π˜ f−1 . . . Π˜1] (5)
where
Π˜i = eıHt/~Πie−ıHt/~. (6)
This probability can be obtained from the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics by assuming that
at each time ti there is a measurement of an observable
whose eigenspaces include Si, and applying the projec-
tion postulate after each measurement. Then P(h) is the
probability that this sequence of measurements has the
results corresponding to the subspaces S1, . . .Sn. It can
be written
p(h) = tr[ChC
†
h] (7)
where Ch is the history operator
Ch = Π˜1 · · · Π˜ f . (8)
In general, these probabilities will not be consistent
with the following natural requirement. Suppose two his-
tories h1 and h2 differ only in the subspaces S(1)i and S(2)i
which they assign to time ti, and that these subspaces are
orthogonal. We can consider a third history h1 ∨ h2 in
which the subspace at time ti is the direct sum S1 ⊕ S2.
In terms of measurement, this describes a result of the
measurement at time ti which was either the result corre-
sponding to S1 or that corresponding to S2; so h1 ∨ h2
relates that the history of the system was either h1 or h2.
We expect that the corresponding probabilities should
satisfy
P(h1 ∨ h2) = P(h1) + P(h2). (9)
In particular, if S1 ⊕ S2 = H , we expect that S1 and S2
are an exhaustive set of possibilities at time ti and so
P(h1) + P(h2) = P(h′) (10)
where h′ is the history which coincides with h1 and h2 at
all times except ti, but does not say anything about time ti.
However, these equations will not in general be true. A
condition which guarantees them is
tr[Ch1C
†
h2
] = 0. (11)
A set of histories is said to be consistent (or decoherent)
if this condition holds true for every pair of different
histories in the set.
This is not an issue in generalised Bell-type theories. It
would be an issue if the transition probabilities (3) were
supposed to apply for transitions to any subspace in the
Boolean algebra generated by the subspaces Si, but that
would not be in accord with the basic presuppositions of
such a theory. To take a linear sum of the preferred sub-
spaces as having the same status as those subspaces would
be to assume that the system could exist in a superposition
of states from the preferred subspaces, whereas the phi-
losophy of these theories is that such superpositions are
not actual states. In the theory of sentient experience, for
example, a sum of experience states describing different
experiences is not an experience state (a sum of eigen-
vectors with different eigenvalues is not an eigenvector).
Thus the state of the system can be in a subspace S1 ⊕S2
only if it is in the subset S1 ∪ S2, and the appropriate
probability is
P(S1 ⊕ S2) = P(S1) + P(S2). (12)
In [17], where probabilities are identified with truth
values, and a history is formed by logical operations from
single-time propositions, the probability of a history was
taken to be given by the usual formula (5). For the de-
velopment of a satisfactory logic, it was then found to
be necessary to make the consistent-histories assumption
(11) (in a somewhat weaker version). I now think that
this was a mistake. If Bell’s transition probabilities had
been used to define the truth value (= probability) of a
history rather than (5), there would have been no need for
a subsidiary assumption, and the logic could have been
developed in much greater generality.
5 Conclusion
John Bell never lost sight of the great enterprise of sci-
ence. He rejected the narrow scepticism and pessimism
in the reaction of the founding fathers of quantum me-
chanics to the difficulties which they encountered, and the
instrumentalist view of physics which became the dogma
in which all physics students were indoctrinated. His own
most famous and influential work only served to empha-
sise the difficulties in the way of understanding quantum
mechanics as he thought physical theories should be un-
derstood. Nevertheless, he persevered in the search for
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such an understanding. His concept of “beables” has
become a standard tool for those seeking to understand
and develop quantum mechanics, and deserves deeper
philosophical analysis. The transition probabilities that
he formulated as a component of theories of such beables
are a lasting legacy of his search, and have proved valu-
able even to those who do not share his vision of what a
satisfactory physical theory should be like.
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